Was There a Silent Revolution? A Comparative Analysis of Party Manifestos in Ten European Countries by Anamarija Musa
 
Politička misao, Vol. XLIII, (2006), No. 5, pp. 121–146 121 
                                                                                                                            
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
329(4)“195/199” 
Primljeno: 12. studenog 2006. 
                                                                                                                            
 
Was There a Silent Revolution? A Comparative 
Analysis of Party Manifestos in Ten European 
Countries 
 









 The Silent Revolution Theory argues that in the second part of 
the 20th century, due to their socialization in an environment of 
economic affluence and absence of war, the citizens of advanced 
industrial democracies became more post-materialist in their value 
orientation; placing a higher value on issues such as personal 
freedom, self-actualisation, gender and racial equality or protection of 
the environment. At the same time, they are expected to put less 
emphasis on materialist values, such as high income or personal 
security. A content analysis of party programmes in 10 European 
countries was carried out in order to establish whether current 
economic, security and democracy levels affect the distribution of 
values and whether it is possible to make a distinction between 
different subtypes of values. The research demonstrates that a 
country’s better economic performance is associated with the rise of 
post-materialism, and that a lower democracy level indicates a higher 
proportion of the human rights dimension of post-materialism at the 
expense of the lifestyle dimension. There was not enough evidence to 
conclude that security problems affect the security dimension of 
materialist values at the expense of the economic dimension. 
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1. Introduction 
 At the end of the 1960s, the explosion of civic discontent and the flour-
ishing of various social movements seeking to raise attention to previously 
neglected social issues came as a surprise for the contemporary analysts of 
political behaviour and party systems of advanced industrial democracies. 
The new issues were raised by distinctive social groups, such as students, the 
well-educated and minority groups, which did not unambiguously fit into 
any of the previously established social classes. Unlike the previous genera-
tions, they refused to accept a social order which neglected personal free-
dom, self-expression, gender and racial equality or the protection of the en-
vironment. Thus, reality challenged two essentially opposing ideas in the 
political science of the 1960s.  
 The first one was the general consensus on class-based models of poli-
tics, best described by Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) ‘frozen party systems’ 
theory, which argued that the political parties of the 1960s, similarly to those 
in the 1920s, represented the final product of historical development of party 
systems through national and industrial revolutions. Consequently, the eco-
nomically based social class was considered to be the best predictor of vot-
ing behaviour, creating a firm basis for the rigid Left-Right division of party 
systems. Similarly, outbursts of political activism seemed to contradict 
Bell’s ‘end of ideology’ thesis, which argued that technical rationality in the 
‘age of affluence’ will replace political conflict with political consensus. 
Ideology will lose its power to mobilize the masses and, in the future, cold 
logic and scientific reasoning should become the omnipotent means of solv-
ing the problems of the post-industrial society.  
 But, “while economic cleavages become less intense with the rising lev-
els of economic development, they gradually give way to other types of con-
flict” (Inglehart, 1997:1292). In other words, the growing polarization along 
the newly raised issues as well as unconventional methods of political be-
haviour predicted that an intense conflict will persist to determine political 
behaviour, but in the future it will not be focused primarily on the old eco-
nomic agenda.  
 Ronald Inglehart's Silent Revolution Theory represents an attempt to ex-
plain the emergence of a new set of values, which “changed the social basis 
of the politics, the modes of political participation, the nature of issues, and 
the support for national and international authorities” (Van Deth, 1983:63). 
Inglehart’s basic assumption is that the generational change underlines this 
value shift from material to post-materialist concerns – the younger genera-
tions, born after World War II, who have not experienced economic and 
physical insecurity during their formative years, will have different value 
priorities than the older generations who have experienced unfavourable cir-
cumstances, such as poverty or war (Inglehart, 1971). For the post-war gen-
erations, the priority to satisfy the basic needs for material goods and physi-
cal security was replaced by an increased importance of the issues of self-
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expression, lifestyles and individual freedom. In other words, if a person 
grows up in the period of economic affluence and security, there is a great 
chance that he or she will place greater value on post-materialist issues, tak-
ing the materialist needs which have been satisfied throughout his or hers 
life for granted.  
 The Silent Revolution Theory served as a basis for numerous analyses, 
which show that the post-materialist value shift is a universal phenomenon, 
not restricted only to advanced Western democracies, and that it can be as-
cribed to increased economic growth in many parts of the world (Inglehart, 
2000:224; Knutsen, 1995). It affects party systems, which undergo signifi-
cant changes and transformations (Flanagan, 1982; Dalton, 1996), changes 
political behaviour, creates a new political culture and leads to a more de-
mocratic society (Inglehart, 2000). Moreover, it is an irreversible phenome-
non on the societal level since the number of post-materialists rises signifi-
cantly with time, by one point of the index per year (Inglehart and Abram-
son, 1994:337). 
 This paper will attempt to confront two problems with Inglehart's theory. 
The first one, by now hardly challenged,1 is the oversimplification of the 
materialist – post-materialist dichotomy (hereinafter: M-PM). It does not 
seem reasonable to expect post-materialist and materialist values to be two 
homogenous groups of values. Is it acceptable to divide a whole range of dif-
ferent desires, needs, attitudes and values into only two broad categories? Is 
the person who favours a strong police because of a high crime rate equally 
materialist to the person who supports strong anti-inflation measures because 
of a severe economic recession?  
 The second problem comes from Inglehart’s argument that early 
socialization has the strongest effect on the formation of post-materialist 
values. Although Inglehart admits that later experiences in life might tempo-
rarily affect value orientations (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994), other re-
searchers showed that period and life cycle effects are underestimated in In-
glehart’s theory (Clarke and Dutt, 1991; Duch and Taylor 1993; Fuchs and 
Rohrschneider, 1998). Hence, high unemployment or wartime may convert 
hard-boiled post-materialists into materialists.  
 Accordingly, this paper will try to address the following question: What 
is the impact of a country’s economic performance, its security problems and 
the level of democracy on the M-PM value orientations of the citizens, and is 
it possible to define different subcategories in these two groups of values? 
Our research confirms that economic performance and democracy level have 
an impact on the distribution of values, while the security thesis is not con-
firmed. Moreover, our findings show that the proposed model rests on sound 
 
1 Debating with Inglehart, Flanagan (1987) tried to develop a more complex concept of the 
libertarian-authoritarian value dimension, restricting the materialist dimension to economic is-
sues only. 
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foundations. The research consists of an analysis of values in party pro-
grammes in 10 European countries. The first part of the paper presents an 
overview of Inglehart’s theory and its critique, our proposed model, and the 
main hypotheses. The research method and the data are presented in the sec-
ond part, while the third part contains the findings and the conclusion.  
 
2. The Silent Revolution Theory: An Overview 
 Ronald Inglehart’s Silent Revolution Theory (Inglehart, 1971, 1977) is 
an influential explanation of the broader process of cultural change visible in 
the second part of the 20th century, i.e. the post-modernisation thesis. As a 
consequence of the economic and technological development, the absence of 
war, the emergence of the welfare state, the expansion of educational op-
portunities and an increase in communication, the value shift from the eco-
nomic features of life towards lifestyle concerns and self-actualisation mani-
fested itself through new types of political participation, increased political 
action, transformation of party systems, decline in social class voting and 
more effective democratic institutions (Inglehart, 2000:26-27).  
 Adopting the political culture approach, which implies that clusters of 
attitudes form durable subjective orientations that are more important than 
the objective conditions of an individual's environment (Jackman and Miller, 
1996:636), Inglehart (1971, 1984, 2000) claims that the conditions of afflu-
ence and security in the post-war period lead to a basic shift in value priori-
ties among the Western European citizens and elites. The generations born 
after World War II experienced unprecedented economic affluence and 
physical security and shifted their priorities from materialist to post-materi-
alist orientation. Conversely, older generations remained oriented towards 
materialistic goals because “variations in subjective orientations reflect dif-
ferences in one's socialization experience, with early learning conditioning 
later learning, making the former more difficult to undo” (Inglehart, 
1977:19). Thus, “as younger generations gradually replace older ones in the 
adult population, the prevailing worldview in these societies is being trans-
formed” (Inglehart, 1977:3). The cultural change is a gradual, but irreversi-
ble process.  
 The starting point for Inglehart’s claim is Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 
which implies that the level of satisfaction of the basic needs determines 
human behaviour. After an individual’s lower needs for food and shelter 
(material needs) are fulfilled, “one feels a sense of satisfaction, but after a 
time, one begins to take one's situation for granted” (Inglehart, 1977a:433). 
Thus, the individual’s priorities turn to the higher-order needs, such as the 
sense of belonging, self-esteem, participation, self-actualisation and the ful-
filment of intellectual and aesthetic potential (post-materialist needs). From 
this basis Inglehart (1977a:433) suggests the first foundation stone of his 
theory: the scarcity hypothesis. “An individual’s priorities reflect the socio-
economic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those 
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things that are in relatively short supply”. In his later works, Inglehart turns 
to the concept of diminishing marginal utility of economic determinism: 
“economic factors tend to play a decisive role under conditions of economic 
scarcity; but as scarcity diminishes, other factors shape society to an in-
creasing degree” (Inglehart, 1987:1289). This is only a restatement of the 
scarcity hypothesis and its transfer from the individual to the societal level. 
 The scarcity hypothesis is supplemented by his second, crucial assump-
tion, which accentuates the persistence of values throughout the individual’s 
life: the socialization hypothesis. “A relationship between socioeconomic 
environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a sub-
stantial time lag is involved because, to a large extent, one’s basic values re-
flect the conditions that prevailed during one’s preadult years” (Inglehart, 
1997:33). In other words, the post-war generations, whose material needs 
were satisfied during their preadult lives due to economic affluence and the 
absence of war, will turn to the higher order non-materialist needs when they 
reach adulthood. At the same time, older generations will remain likely to 
give priority to material needs. Consequently, the natural generational re-
placement will give rise to post-materialism and a general decline of eco-
nomic issues on the political agenda in favour of questions of lifestyle and 
political participation (Kitschelt, 1994).  
 In order to empirically support his theory, Inglehart constructed a simple 
questionnaire, asking respondents to single out the two most important 
things from the following list: (1) maintaining order in the nation, (2) giving 
people more say in important political decisions, (3) fighting rising prices 
and (4) protecting freedom of speech (Inglehart, 1971:994). According to 
their answers, respondents were classified as materialists (those choosing the 
1st and the 3rd items on the list), post-materialists (the 2nd and the 4th items), 
and mixed type (combination). The more developed 12-item battery includes 
eight additional issues: those regarding economic growth, economic stabil-
ity, strong defence forces and fighting crime indicate a materialist value ori-
entation, while those relating to greater participation, less impersonal and a 
more humane society, a higher valuation of ideas, and making the living en-
vironment more beautiful reveal post-materialism. Using the 4-item battery 
in surveys during the 1970s and the modified 12-item battery in the later 
surveys, and constructing post-materialism indices on the basis of responses, 
Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990, 2000) showed that there was a shift towards 
post-materialism in most of the Western European countries as a conse-
quence of the increased affluence of these societies, and that among the 
younger generations there is a higher proportion of post-materialists than 
among the older generations. 
 Inglehart suggests that post-materialism is a major force behind the 
emergence of the New Class, which is distinctive in occupational and edu-
cational characteristics and prevailingly concentrated in the upper socioeco-
nomic strata (Inglehart, 1981:895). Since their material needs are satisfied, 
they have a “larger amount of psychic energy available for politics, they are 
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less supportive of the established social order, and subjectively, they have 
less to lose from unconventional political action than Materialists” (Ingle-
hart, 1981:890).  
 The New Class raised a new set of issues, such as protection of the envi-
ronment, nuclear power, sustainable development, women’s rights, etc. and 
it is no longer focused on the old economic agenda and redistributive poli-
cies. Thus, economic prosperity and the welfare state made it possible for a 
large part of society to abandon the claim for further distribution and to turn 
to the issues of “the public's sense of justice, social solidarity, and other 
nonmaterial motivations” (Inglehart, 1977:253). Consequently, since the 
problems that preoccupied the Old Left were solved and “reached the point 
of diminishing returns” (Inglehart, 1987:1295), instead of the old Left-Right 
cleavage2, the party systems of advanced industrial societies are experienc-
ing a growing tendency of polarization along the new M-PM dimension, 
which cuts across the old Left-Right axis (Inglehart, 1984:26)3. The New 
Class is expected to find its political expression in the New Left, while the 
working class is expected to move more to the Right, as a consequence of 
the split between the post-materialist and the materialist Left (Inglehart, 
1984:28; Dalton, 1996:188). In a similar sense, in order to cover some parts 
of the ‘new issues’, smaller post-materialist parties emerge (e.g. green par-
ties). In sum, Inglehart (1984) argues that rising post-materialism has placed 
the existing party alignments under chronic stress and that a possible out-
come could be dealignment, realignment or the gradual assimilation of the 
new axis of polarization in the new party constellation. 
 The New Politics thesis is also supported by other authors, but some of 
them do not agree that support for new values could constitute the basis for a 
new group-party alignment. Instead, “electoral politics is moving from 
cleavages defined by fixed social groups to value and issue cleavages which 
identify communities of like-minded individuals” (Dalton, 1996:193). 
 
3. Has There Been a Silent Revolution? A Critique of 
Inglehart’s Concept 
 Similarly to any other theory attempting to explain a whole range of so-
cial phenomena in a simple way, Inglehart’s theory was subsequently chal-
lenged and debated. Although many authors confirmed some of his argu-
 
2 Inglehart (1984:26) defines political cleavage as a “relatively stable patterns of polariza-
tion in which given groups support given policies or parties, while other groups support oppos-
ing policies or parties.”  
3 Erickson and Laycock (2002) claim that post-materialist values do not replace the old 
Left-Right concerns: they found that Canadian social democrats support a post-materialist 
agenda on top of their class equality goals. 
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ments (Dalton, 1977, 1996; Flanagan, 1982; Gibson and Duch, 1994, Opp 
1990; Scarbrough, 1995), some of them contested his basic assumptions.  
 The first group of criticism relates to Inglehart’s core thesis about the 
causal relationship between economic affluence and post-materialism, ac-
centuating the importance of other factors such as education (Dalton, 1977; 
Duch and Taylor, 1993; Kitschelt, 1995; Scarbrough, 1995) or wartime ex-
perience (De Graaf and Evans, 1996). For example, Betz (1990:252) argues 
that the German Greens, as typical post-materialists, are highly educated but 
not economically secure. Similarly, De Graaf and Evans (1996:610) argue 
that post-materialism seems to be related to non-economic factors, such as 
severity of war experience, expansion of educational opportunities and the 
welfare state.  
 The second type of criticism refers to the measurement problem and the 
reliability of the post-materialist index (Clarke and Dutt, 1991, Jackman and 
Miller, 1996, Duch and Taylor, 1993; Flanagan, 1982). The question is: what 
is measured and how. Some authors argue that Inglehart’s index does not 
measure materialist and post-materialist values but short-term political pref-
erences or attitudes (Trump, 1991; Van Deth, 1983; Clarke and Dutt, 1991), 
liberal values (De Graaf and Evans, 1996; Duch and Taylor, 1993) or that it 
is focused on terminal instead of instrumental values (Flanagan, 1982)4.  
 The format of the battery was also heavily disputed. Critics argued that 
the format of the questionnaire leads to a ‘dilemma of constrained choice’ 
and that a disproportionately large number of respondents will fall into the 
mixed category (Flanagan, 1987); or that it stimulates random responses and, 
hence, does not permit inference from the individual to the societal level 
(Davis and Davenport, 1999:662). Similarly, Clarke et al. (1997) argue that 
the Euro-barometer battery, which measures post-materialist values, is an 
example of the ‘conversations in context’ problem because it is very sensi-
tive to current macroeconomic conditions, showing that high unemployment 
and low inflation will artificially increase the number of post-materialists, 
because instead of choosing ‘fighting rising prices’, the respondents will 
choose one of the post-materialist options.  
 Finally, the third group of criticism relates to the debate over the impor-
tance of four different factors in the formation of post-materialist orienta-
tions: generational (or cohort) effects (political socialization in times of eco-
nomic well-being), period effects (good economic performance), life-cycle 
effects and educational effects. Setting up his theory on socialization thesis 
in his later work, Inglehart admits that period effects might temporarily af-
fect the rise of materialism, but does not accept the relevance of life-cycle 
effects (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994).  
 
4 Trump’s research (1991:383) among secondary school students in the US and Germany 
led him to conclude that post-materialist orientations might not be fundamental 'values' but 
rather short-term social and political attitudes. 
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 However, research shows that period effects might be more important 
than Inglehart allows and that values learned during the formative years are 
not long-lasting or stable (Van Deth, 1983; Flanagan, 1987; Duch and Tay-
lor, 1993; Scarbrough, 1995). For example, an analysis of the impact of 
German unification on the value shift showed that economic, immigration 
and security issues became more salient to voters, while the interest in post-
material issues was reduced (Fuchs and Rohrschneider, 1998). Similarly, re-
search carried out in eight West European countries between 1973-84, sug-
gests that rather than early socialization, education and economic conditions 
at the time of the survey are much more important factors in explaining the 
variations in the post-materialist index (Duch and Taylor, 1993).  
 In sum, the research gives strong evidence for the importance of the 
short-term factors. It seems that post-materialists are likely to refocus their 
attention to economic issues in the turbulent times of economic or physical 
insecurity and that “the relative priority that a respondent attaches to eco-
nomic issues in relation to other concerns varies across the life cycle as the 
respondent’s economic responsibilities and burdens change” (Flanagan, 
1987:309). 
 
4. A New Model: The Spreading of the Dichotomy  
 Our research tries to address the criticism directed towards the substance 
of Inglehart’s theory and, at the same time, avoid repeating the problematic 
methodology. First, in order to overcome the simplicity of his concept, we 
offer a more elaborate scheme of the M-PM value dimension by dividing the 
two basic categories into further subcategories (see Figure 1). Second, we 
tackle the socialization vs. period effects debate by establishing whether cur-
rent macroeconomic issues, security problems or the democracy level affect 
the distribution of values. Third, we explore what the impact of a country’s 
economic affluence is on the relationship between materialist and post-mate-
rialist values.  
 First, in order to evaluate the impact of economic and non-economic fac-
tors on post-materialism, we tested whether the current economic affluence 
of a society is a strong predictor of post-materialism. We expect that post-
materialism grows with economic affluence. Second, we split Inglehart’s 4-
item battery by dividing the post-materialist values into two categories – one 
concerned with human rights in general and another one related to lifestyle 
issues. We expect that the ratio between the ‘human rights’ and the ‘life-
style’ dimension changes with the level of democracy in the country because 
lower levels of democratisation will be conducive to the ‘human rights’ di-
mension at the expense of the ‘lifestyle’ dimension. This way, we are taking 
the scarcity hypothesis into account, but instead of the socialization hypothe-
sis we argue for period effects. By the same token, if we divide the materi-
alist values into two categories – ‘economic’ and ‘security’, we expect that 
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security problems in a country would raise the ‘security’ dimension of mate-
rialist values at the expense of the ‘economic’ category.  
 













 According to our assumptions, we can state the following hypotheses:  
 Hypothesis 1: Electoral programmes of political parties in more affluent 
societies include more post-materialist values than those in less affluent so-
cieties.  
 Hypothesis 2: In countries with security problems party programmes in-
clude more ‘security’ values than ‘economic’ values, while in countries 
without security problems party programmes include more ‘economic’ val-
ues than ‘security’ values. 
 Hypothesis 3: In countries with a higher level of democratisation party 
programmes include more ‘lifestyle’ than ‘human rights’ post-materialist 
values. Conversely, in less democratic countries party programmes include 
more ‘human rights’ values than ‘lifestyle’ post-materialist values.  
 
5. The Research Method 
 Responding to the critique of Inglehart’s empirical method, instead of us-
ing questionnaires to measure the individual level political attitudes, we 
conducted an analysis of party programmes in 10 European countries, which 
showed us how post-materialist and materialist values are distributed among 
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5.1 The Function of Party Programmes  
 Our starting point is the notion that parties serve as mediators between 
citizens’ demands and public outcomes (Klingemann, 1995:183), expressing 
the views of their supporters and aggregating political interests. In opposi-
tion to the argument that citizens have been abandoned by their parties, 
which has lead the representative democracy into a state of crisis (see 
Klingemann, 1995:200), there is evidence that parties are “energetic actors, 
identifying new sources of support and modifying their electoral appeals ac-
cordingly, in order to maintain their electoral bases” (Rose, 1982; quoted in 
McAllister and Studlar, 1995:213).  
 The best way for a party to achieve its mediating function is through its 
election programme, which translates public values and interests into a pro-
gramme of governing (Pennings and Keman, 2002:55). Although “the tradi-
tional view of party manifestos treated them as a representation of the 
party’s ideological orientation, updated for the new elections” (Caul and 
Gray, 2000:215), their content has changed. As a consequence of the weak-
ening of the traditional social cleavages and the softening of the Left-Right 
party divisions, the party programmes are to a large extent responding to re-
ality and to the existing problems in the social environment.  
 This claim is in line with the theory of partisan convergence, set by 
Kirchheimer in 1966 (Mair, 1997). The research confirmed that during the 
1960s and the 1970s a convergence of the parties toward the centre of the 
Left-Right scale took place (Klingemann et al, 1994:247; Mair, 1997; Knut-
sen, 1988; Caul and Gray, 2000:210).5 The ‘catch-all’ nature of parties is 
even more emphasized in the post-communist countries, since their elector-
ates are more open and “less likely to be underpinned by a strong cleavage 
structure” (Mair, 1997:181; Dalton, 1996a:339). Instead of relying on party 
loyalties, the post-communist party leaders found themselves in a situation 
where “almost all votes are up for grabs” (Geddes, 1995:252). 
 Hence, the attempt to keep the traditional voters and at the same time at-
tract new ones results in a strong pressure on parties to respond to relevant 
problems. In this regard “election programs seem to be responding, at least 
indirectly, to issues affecting the total national electorate” (Klingeman et al., 
1994:30). A research of 26 Left-Right categories in party manifestos con-
firms that parties respond to their environment in formulating their pro-
grammes and that parties may have shifted from ‘selling’ to ‘marketing’ is-
sues, reflecting instead of shaping public opinions. (Caul and Gray, 2000: 
210).  
 Briefly, the absence of clear social clues and party divisions that results 
in greater electoral volatility forces political parties to be more responsive to 
 
5 The research of party programmes in 12 European countries in the 1970s and the 1980s 
shows that there is a pattern of convergence between parties and voters but that parties tend to 
be more centrist than their supporters (Klingemann, 1995:201). 
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the interests and needs of the citizens. At the same time, the voting decision 
becomes ‘a more demanding task for voters … more dependent on the indi-
vidual beliefs and values…’ (Dalton, 1996:194). In this respect, electoral 
programmes offer a direction for voters and give an approximate reflection 
of the values and interests of the electorate in general.  
 Content analysis of party programmes was often used to estimate a 
party’s Left-Right position (Gabel and Huber, 2000), party identities (Janda 
et al., 1995), salience of issues, party convergence (Klingemann, 1995), etc. 
The manifestos were analysed by different methods, such as, hand coding, 
computerised coding and expert opinions, each having advantages and dis-
advantages (see Laver and Gary, 2000). 
 
5.2. The Methodological Approach  
 For the purpose of our research, the party programmes were analysed us-
ing content analysis method relying on the (hand) coding system applied 
since 1979 by the Manifesto Research Group in the Comparative Manifestos 
Project (hereinafter: CMP). The CMP includes nearly 2000 party pro-
grammes, which are coded with the help of a coding scheme based on 56 
categories divided into 7 domains covering all main topics of these docu-
ments. The unit of analysis in the CMP is a quasi-sentence, defined as either 
a complete sentence or a part of a sentence relating to one political idea. 
Every quasi-sentence is assigned to one coding category. Relative propor-
tions are obtained on the basis of each category’s frequency.  
 There are several shortcomings underlying the CMP method, such as 
unreliability caused by the definition of a quasi-sentence, or overlapping and 
missing categories (Pennings and Keman, 2002:55). In addition, Gabel and 
Huber (2000) argue that the comparability of the programmes might be af-
fected by differences in the length of the programmes, party size (major par-
ties are expected to cover a wider range of issues), government participation 
(incumbent parties are more likely to write good manifestos), and country 
specificities.  
 However, since the method is widely used and it has obtained valuable 
results, our research was based on a similar procedure. Each party pro-
gramme was divided into coding units or quasi-sentences that contain one 
political idea. The total amount of all quasi-sentences in each programme is 
comprised of quasi-sentences carrying the idea related to the M-PM values 
we want to measure (codes E, S, H, L), but also of sentences expressing val-
ues or issues in which we are not interested (code 000). After counting all 
quasi-sentences, the proportions and percentages for each type of values 
were compared according to our hypotheses. Some parts of the programmes 
were omitted, such as tables of content, section headings, introductory re-
marks, overviews of the historical development of the party, summaries or 
excerpts. 
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5.3 Sampling Rationale  
 Although the complete study would benefit from an extensive analysis of 
all parties in all European countries, time and resources at our disposal acted 
as limitations. Thus, we focused on available programmes, which were 
downloaded from the parties’ web pages in July and August 2004. Due to 
technical problems (programme not available, language issues), we were 
forced to narrow our analysis to five old EU members (Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom) and five post-communist countries 
(the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia), which makes a 
total of 10 countries. From the total of 62 parties and coalitions that entered 
parliaments in the last parliamentary elections in the chosen countries, we 
decided to analyse the manifestos of those which won at least 8% of votes. 
This brings us to 37 parties or coalitions. Together, the chosen parties won 
between 64.5% and 90.7% of votes, with an average of 81.58%. In most of 
the countries, these parties received between 78% and 90% of the votes.  
 Our final sample consisted of 35 party programmes (2 out of the original 
37 party programmes were too short for analysis). The lengths of the pro-
grammes range from 4 to 98 pages or from 83 to 1262 units. Approximately 
53.23% of the coding units fall in the 000 category, ranging from 47.64% in 
Austria to 63.19% in Bulgaria. In some cases, due to the unavailability of 
programmes from the latest elections, we decided to use programmes from 
the previous elections.  
 
6. The Data 
 Our basic assumption was that the 10 countries can be placed in different 
positions regarding their economic performance, security issues and democ-
racy level, and that the distribution of post-materialist and materialist values 
and their subcategories changes with variations in the independent variable.  
 In essence, we divided the materialist values into ‘economic’ and the 
‘security’ categories, each further comprising of three subcategories: the first 
category relates to the economic development, monetary policy and unem-
ployment; while the second consists of statehood issues, the military, and 
law and order. Likewise, we established subcategories of post-materialist 
values: freedom and human rights, and social justice and political participa-
tion relate to the ‘human rights’ dimension, while the environment, educa-
tion and culture belong to the ‘lifestyle’ dimension. A detailed description of 
categories and subcategories is presented in Table 1. Some issues were not 
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CATEGORY CODE SUBCATEGORY DESCRIPTION 
E01 Economic development 
Productivity, market (de)regulation, economic 
competition, investments 
E02 Monetary policy Anti-inflation measures, central bank, bank system, financial market 
ECONOMIC
(E) 
E03 Unemployment Measures for tackling unemployment 
S01 Statehood issues 
Need to resolve territorial problems, 
consolidation of the state, control of state 
borders, security issues, mentioning of 
historical development of the nation and war 
victories  

















S03 Law and order 
Enforcement of all laws, secure legal 
environment, actions against crime, support 
and resources for police, improvement of the 
justice system, fighting corruption 
H01 Freedom and human rights 
Importance of personal freedom and civil 
rights, freedom of speech, freedom from 
coercion in the political and economic spheres, 
protection of minority rights 
H02 Social justice 
Equality and solidarity, special protection for 
the underprivileged, end of discrimination, 





H03 Political participation 
Broader political participation; inclusion of 
citizens in political decision-making; support 
for devolution, regional and local autonomy; 
L01 Environment 
Preservation of nature and natural resources, 
proper use of common goods, improvement of 
the environment, use of energy; environment-
friendly transport system and technology; 
sustainable development; protection of 





Raising the spending on education, 
development of scientific research, support for 
universities and institutes, development of 
knowledge society, information society and use 

















L03 Culture and sports
Need to provide cultural and leisure facilities, 
investments in cultural institutions, need to 
promote cultural heritage, cultural mass media; 
 
 Firstly, we counted the frequencies for each subcategory, as well as zero-
units (000 code), and calculated the percentages. Secondly, we computed ra-
tios for each of our three hypotheses: for the first one: the ratio of post-mate-
rialist and materialist values (R1); for the second hypothesis: the ratio of se-
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curity and economic values (R2); for the third hypothesis: the ratio of life-
style and human rights issues (R3). Thirdly, we ranked the countries ac-
cording to the obtained ratios. Finally, we compared how the ranks scored on 
the dependent variable related to the ranks scored on our independent vari-
ables.  
 Our first hypothesis relates to the impact that a country’s economic per-
formance has on the relationship between post-materialist and materialist 
values. As an indicator of economic performance we applied GDP per capita 
at Purchase Parity Rate, because high GDP is generally perceived as an indi-
cator of economic security (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994:347) and ‘the 
powerful predictor’ of post-materialist values (Dalton, 1977; Inglehart, 
1990). We ranked the countries from 1 to 10 accordingly, expecting that a 
higher GDP per capita is connected with a rise of post-materialist values. 
 The second hypothesis relates to the connection between security prob-
lems such as wartime, high crime rate, questions of territorial integrity, 
problems with borders, etc., and the ratio of security and economic materi-
alist values. We expected that a larger number of security problems results in 
frequent mentioning of security issues in electoral programmes. In absence 
of a better measure (such as general crime rate), we used the percentage of 
the GDP that was spent on the military and the number of homicides per 100 
000 inhabitants as indicators of security. Again, we ranked the countries ac-
cording to our independent variable and compared the ranks with the ranking 
on the security vs. economic values ratio scale.  
 According to our third hypothesis, we expected that a higher level of de-
mocracy results in a greater proportion of lifestyle values in relation to hu-
man rights issues. As an indicator for democratisation we applied Freedom 
House ratings to compute our average democracy ratings. The Freedom in 
the World survey conducted by the Freedom House organisation provides an 
annual evaluation of the state of global freedom, assessing political rights 
and civil liberties on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents the most free 
and 7 the least free category.6 Our average ratings were obtained by adding 
up all the ratings given to a country in the eight years preceding the elec-
tions, including the year of the elections, divided by 16 (there are two ratings 
for each year, on political rights and civil liberties scales). The countries 
were ranked accordingly. The democracy rank was compared to the coun-





6 The Freedom House list of items includes political rights relating to the electoral process, 
political participation, functioning of government, freedom of expression, associational and or-
ganizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. 
 
Politička misao, Vol. XLIII, (2006), No. 5, pp. 121–146 135 
                                                                                                                            
7. Findings 
 In general, our findings suggest that two of our three hypotheses have 
empirical foundations, namely Hypotheses 1 and 3. The summarized data are 
presented in Tables 2-47. The division corresponds to the grouping of the 
countries according to their economic performance (high GDP countries / 
medium and low GDP countries). 
 
Table 3: Ratios 





Austria (2002) 5.68 1.32 1.32 
Finland (2003) 4.18 0.17 0.73 
Germany (2002) 2.65 0.77 1.92 
Ireland (2002) 2.20 1.93 2.02 
UK (2001) 146 1.83 2.53 
Average 1 2.15 1.20 1.28 
Bulgaria (2001) 1.01 0.69 1.11 
Croatia (2003) 2.60 0.58 1.09 
Czech Rep. (2002) 1.58 1.02 2.38 
Serbia (2003) 1.07 1.73 1.17 
Slovenia (2000) 2.37 0.96 1.95 
Average 1 1.41 0.98 1.56 
Total average  1.78 1.09 1.42 
 
 There is some evidence that our Hypothesis 1 rests on sound foundations 
(see Tables 3 and 4 and Graphs 1 and 2). First, the data show that the most 
affluent country, Austria, also has the highest PM/M ratio: for each materi-
alist value, the party programmes contain 5.68 post-materialist values. Con-
sequently, the two poorest countries have the lowest PM/M ratios (Serbia 
1.07, Bulgaria 1.01), meaning that for each materialist value, there is only 
one post-materialist value. Hence, in these two countries, the post-materialist 
values are equally important to the materialist values. Second, there is a 
gentle drop in ratios towards the right end of the graph. If we divide the 
graph in two parts, we can see that the five countries with a high GDP per 
capita have higher ratios (average ratio 2.15) while the countries with a 
lower GDP have lower ratios (average ratio 1.41). In this case, only four 
 
7 See Table 2 at the end of this paper. 
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countries’ ratios do not respond to our expectations, but these results can be 
explained. 
 















tures as % 
of GDPc 








(2002)  4 30,000  1 3 0.80 9  2.3 8  5 1.00  1 
Finland 
(2003)  3 27,300  5 9 2.00 5 10.1 1  1 1.00  1 
Germany 
(2002)  2 27,600  4 6 1.50 7  4.3 6  6 1.50  4 
Ireland 
(2002)  8 29,800  2 1 0.90 8  1.4 9  8 1.06  3 
UK  
(2001)  1 27,700  3 2 2.40 2  8.3 3 10 1.50  4 
Bulgaria 
(2001)  7 7,600  9 7 2.60 1  8.9 2  4 2.00  8 
Croatia 
(2003)  6 10,700  8 8 2.39 3  6.8 4  2 3.31  9 
Czech Rep. 
(2002)  9 15,700  6 4 2.10 4  2.6 7  9 1.50  4 
Serbia 
(2003)a 10 2,300 10 - - - - -  3 4.81 10 
Slovenia 
(2000)  5 18,300  7 5 1.70 6  6.0 5  7 1.56  7 
a  All data relate to Serbia and Montenegro. Some data were not available. 
b  Source: http://www.cia.gov; estimation for 2003. 
c Source: http://www.cia.gov ; Data relate to years 1998/99 (Finland), 2000 (Slove-
nia) 2000/01 (Ireland), 2001/02 (Austria), 2002 est. (Croatia, Czech Republic) 
2003 (Germany, UK, Bulgaria). 
d  Source: http://www.europeansourcebook.org/esb/chapter1/1b3.pdf 
e  Source: average ratings computed on the basis of the freedom ratings from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org 
 
 Firstly, the UK’s and Ireland’s low ratios result from their high score on 
security dimension (11.71% and 8.45%; Group 1 average 7.61%) because 
the issue of security and order is highly important in these countries. For in-
stance, in the subcategory S03 (Law and order) the UK’s score is 9.27% 
while the average for Group 1 is 5.54%. On the other hand, Germany has an 
above average score in the economy dimension (7.49%; the Group 1 average 
6.23%), especially in the E03 subcategory, which is most probably caused 
by the high unemployment rate in Germany (10.7% in 2003, Group 1 aver-
age 6.86%).8 Finally, Croatia’s high PM/M ratio might be attributed to the 
 
8 For unemployment rates see http://www.cia.org 
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importance of human rights issues, such as minority rights and social justice 
(H=17.97%; Group 2 average 10.45%). Besides, if we look more closely at 
Graph 1, we can see that the materialist value rates grow as the GDP falls. 
Again, the UK, Ireland and Croatia are significantly dislocated from the ex-
pected positions. In sum, we can say that Hypothesis 1 is confirmed with a 
qualified acceptance. 
 


































30 29,8 27,7 27,6 27,3 18,3 15,7 10,7 7,6 2,3







138 Musa, A., Was There a Silent Revolution? A Comparative ...                                                                                                                             
Graph 2:  Ratio of Post-materialist and Materialist Values in Relation to 
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 According to Hypothesis 2, security problems should give rise to the 
security dimension of materialist values, at the expense of the economic di-
mension. If we look closer at the first indicator (Tables 3 and 4, Graphs 3 
and 4), we can see that the results only partially correspond to our expectation. 
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 While German, Slovenian, Czech and UK ratios behave according to our 
hypothesis, five countries show significant aberrations. Austria and Ireland 
have high security ratios (1.32 and 1.93) and at the same time they spend a 
small portion of their funds on the armed forces. The results can be ex-
plained by the fact that both countries devote less attention to the economic 
issues – they are the two most affluent countries in our sample, with a low 
unemployment rate (Austria 4.3%, Ireland 5%). Hence, it is reasonable to 
conclude that security issues will be given more attention in the party pro-
grammes. On the other hand, Bulgaria and Croatia are located on the right 
end of the military expenditures scale, but at the same time they have a low 
security ratio (0.69 and 0.58). Part of the explanation might be found in the 
fact that both countries’ armed forces are inherited from the former post-
communist regime and they are still undergoing significant reforms. More-
over, high military expenditures in Croatia can, to a high degree, be ascribed 
to the war in the 1990s. On the other hand, the low security ratio in these two 
countries can be attributed to the high salience of economic issues, since 
both countries are still trying to catch up with EU members.  
 Finally, Finland’s surprisingly low security ratio is much harder to ex-
plain. Although Finland’s high unemployment rate (9.2% in 2003) could be 
a part of the explanation (E03=5.43%, Group 1 average 2.79), it is quite un-
believable that the country which “according to statistics, […] is one of the 
most violent countries in Europe” (The Green League Party Platform, 
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2000:17) pays almost no attention at all to security issues. The European 
Sourcebook data on crime rates show that among the 10 countries from our 
sample, Finland ranks first in homicide and second in rape and assault. 
 Graph 4 shows that the relationship between the homicide rate and secu-
rity ratio is exactly the inverse of what was expected in Hypothesis 2. Only 
the UK’s ratio disrupts this reversed line. It is difficult to determine whether 
our Hypothesis 2 remains unconfirmed due to the parties’ lack of interest for 
security issues, high salience of the economic dimension, or the wrong indi-
cators. In any case, Hypothesis 2 cannot be confirmed and seeks further ex-
ploration. 
 In Hypothesis 3, we claimed that the ratio of lifestyle vs. human rights 
values is higher if the country is more democratic. Hence, the human rights 
dimension of post-materialist values will be more salient in less democratic 
societies.  
 If we divide the 10 countries into three groups according to their democ-
racy ratings, our findings (see Tables 3 and 4 and Graph 5) show that eight 
countries’ ratios are located as expected. First, the group of countries with 
low democratic level, which are at the same time all post-communist coun-
tries still on their way to full democratisation (Bulgaria 2,2, Croatia 3,31 and 
Serbia 4,81 democracy rating), has the lowest life-style ratio: we found ap-
proximately one life-style issue for each human right issue (1,09-1,17). 
Thus, we can conclude that human rights are still very important and that the 
lifestyle dimension does not overcome the human rights dimension. 
 
Graph 5:  Ratio of Lifestyle and Human Rights Values in Relation to the 
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 Second, three out of seven democratic countries (ratios 1.06-1.56) have 
similarly high ratios: in these countries party programmes recognise 2 (Ger-
many, Slovenia, Ireland) or 2.5 lifestyle values (UK and Czech Republic) for 
each human rights value.  
 Finally, the two most democratic countries are dislocated: contrary to ex-
pectations, Finland’s lifestyle ratio is the lowest (0.73), while Austria’s ratio 
(1.32) is somewhat higher than the ratio of the less democratic group, and 
considerably lower than the ratio of the democratic group with the rating of 
1.5. But, we believe that it is possible to explain the awkward positions of 
these two countries. Thus, Finland’s low life-style ratio can be attributed to 
its strong tradition of the welfare state, the rules of the electoral game, and to 
the party ideology, which all work in favour of the human rights dimension. 
Finland scores well above average in freedom and human rights (7.58%) and 
social justice (10.46%). At the same time, Finland's parties pay little atten-
tion to education (3.52%; Group 1 average 6.97%) and almost completely 
neglect culture (0.60%; Group 1 average 4.35%). The low percentage in the 
education category can be explained by the high level of education of Fin-
nish society – among the 10 countries, Finland has the highest ratio of en-
rolment in tertiary education.9 Similarly, the Austrian low, but still positive, 
lifestyle ratio (1.32) can be attributed to the high importance of minority 
rights. Hence, with only Finland and Austria significantly departing from 
expected results, we can conclude that Hypothesis 3 is confirmed.  
 On the whole, our proposed Hypotheses 1 and 3 have empirical basis. 
We can conclude that a country’s high economic performance is associated 
with a higher proportion of post-materialist values in relation to materialist 
values. Similarly, in more democratic countries, the lifestyle dimension of 
post-materialist values is considerably higher than the human rights dimen-
sion. Hence, we can deduce firstly, that period effects do matter and, sec-
ondly, that Inglehart’s dichotomy can be further divided in the proposed di-
rection. Conversely, not only did we fail to confirm our Hypothesis 2, but we 
also noticed that the relationship between military expenditures and security 
ratio goes in the direction opposite to the one we expected. One possible ex-
planation is that our indicator is not adequate: high military expenditures 
could also indicate a high security level. In any case, our Hypothesis 2 
should be further explored, using a better security indicator, such as total 
crime rate or the citizens’ personal sense of security.  
 In general, our findings might be skewed because of the sample of the 
countries and political parties – there are a different number of parties in 
each country, their strength is different, and their programmes are not of the 
same length. The shortness of the programmes might be one of the reasons 
why Finland (994 units) and Croatia (829 units; average 1982.5 units) fall 
 
9 For gross enrolment in tertiary education ratio see http://stats.uis.unesco.org/eng/Report 
Folders/Rfview/explorerp.asp 
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out of line. In addition, the choice of the countries might have affected our 
results. 
 There is also a possibility that, after all, party programmes do not reflect 
the values and interests of the citizens as we previously assumed. Some of 
the analysed programmes show that their writers cannot escape the burden of 
their ideological past. A qualitative analysis of the programmes indicates 
that most of the programmes clearly reflect their party’s Left-Right orienta-
tion, and that certain parties completely disregard some issues that are con-
sidered to be extremely important by other parties in the country. In order to 
explore this methodological problem more deeply, the data obtained from 
the analysis of all party programmes in one country should be compared 
with the individual level values survey in the same country. This way we 
could determine whether the programmes reflect the values of the citizens at 
all, and if they do, to what extent.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we tested 3 hypotheses about the relationship between 
different types of values, depending on the country’s economic performance, 
security problems and democracy level. Our starting point was Inglehart’s 
theory on post-materialist value shift. We further developed his theory by 
drawing a distinction between two subcategories of materialist and post-
materialist values and by claiming that the two types of values cannot be re-
garded as two homogenous groups.  
 Our findings confirmed two hypotheses: a country’s better economic per-
formance is associated with the rise of post-materialism, while a lower de-
mocracy level indicates a higher proportion of the human rights dimension 
of post-materialism at the expense of the lifestyle dimension. There was not 
enough evidence to conclude that security problems in a country give rise to 
the security dimension at the expense of the economic dimension of materi-
alist values. The failure to confirm this hypothesis might partially be as-
cribed to an inadequate indicator of security.  
 Hence, we propose a more sophisticated methodological approach for fu-
ture research: including a greater number of countries and parties, creating 
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